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Abstract
Manufacturing price markup equations are estimated for 15 OECD countries
using annual data. The speciﬁc a t i o ni sb a s e do naC E Sp r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n
where the markup depends on demand, competitors’ prices and uncertainty. We
test for cointegration using the Pedroni panel tests and a panel version of the
Johansen test, and ﬁnd evidence for unique cointegrating vectors. Estimation of
the long-run parameters is performed with a pooled mean group method, leaving
the short run heterogeneous dynamics unconstrained. Tests for homogeneity of
the long-run parameters do not reject the hypothesis. Markups are pro-cyclical
a n dr i s ew i t hb o t hc o m p e t i t o r s ’p r i c e sa n du n c e r t a i n t y .
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11 Introduction
The world economy has returned to a low inﬂation regime. Price inﬂa t i o ni nE u -
rope and much of the rest of the developed world is now close to zero. The demand
management controversies of the past are now largely consigned to history, and the
attention of policymakers is now almost exclusively ﬁx e do ni n ﬂation and price deter-
mination. At the same time, macroeconomists are increasingly focusing on the price
determination process.1 In Europe there is now a common monetary policy among the
members of EMU.The gain from this institutional change is that inﬂation credibility
is enhanced. However, the size of the costs following inﬂationary shocks will depend
on the degree of heterogeneity in the real side of the member economies. Diﬀerences
in real supply side behaviour will surface in both wage and price setting. Similarly,
if the world is to move back to widespread ﬁxed exchange rates, it is vital to know
whether diﬀerent economies have similar price responses to shocks. This all makes
it worthwhile, and arguably vital, to establish what international regularities in price
setting behaviour exist. Yet, surprisingly, there is very little single country analysis of
the price markup equation, and even less cross-country work.2 This paper attempts
to address this imbalance by examining the markup over marginal costs in a small
panel of OECD countries. Moreover, in a recent paper in this Journal, Neiss (2001)
uses unit labour costs to proxy international variation in the markup, and equivalently
competitiveness, in a model of the inﬂation bias. Other authors (eg, Gali et al (2001))
have recently reinterpreted the Phillips curve as a dynamic pricing equation, where
marginal costs are proxied by unit labour costs. Yet this relies upon the maintained
hypothesis that production technology is Cobb Douglas. Relaxing this assumption
allows a more general speciﬁcation of the marginal cost. In this paper, we are able to
reject the Cobb Douglas assumption, and this has implications for the work referred
to above.
Use of a panel of this type raises some important methodological issues.3 There has
been an increasing interest in the use of panel techniques in macroeconomics, rather
than the micro and labour based data sets in which panel methods have traditionally
been used. Country panels tend to have dimensions in T and N of roughly equal
orders.4 As static models are rarely adequate for typical time series, dynamic models
are usually appropriate. The small T problems with dynamic panels5 are not relevant
here as the ﬁxed-eﬀects problem from the initial conditions declines rapidly as T
rises. But instead, there are profound problems that result from heterogeneity in the
model parameters that emerge as soon as a lagged dependent variable is introduced.
1See the references cited in Martin (1997).
2This disregards the large literature on purchasing power parity, which does not attempt, except
indirectly, to estimate the markup over costs. For the UK, the main papers are Martin (1997), Smith
(2000) and Price (1991) and (1992). Alogoskouﬁs et al (1990) uses a panel of OECD countries,
focussing on the role of competitors’ prices.
3See Hall and Urga (1998) for a recent survey and analysis of some panel estimation issues that are
relevant to the case we consider here, and the November 1999 Special Issue of the Oxford Bulletin
of Economics and Statistics.
4In the current paper which uses annual data, T and N are 27 and 15 respectively.
5Arellano and Bond (1991).
2This problem was forcefully addressed by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Unlike in static
models, estimates are inconsistent even in large samples. Happily, in typical data
sets T is suﬃciently large to allow individual country estimation. Pesaran and Smith
observe that while it is implausible that the dynamic speciﬁcation is common to all
countries, it is at least conceivable that the long-run parameters of the model may
be common. We can then exploit the cross-sectional dimension to gain more precise
estimates of these average long-run parameters. They then propose estimation by
either averaging the individual country estimates, or (Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999))
by pooling the long-run parameters, if the data allows.
With non-stationary data, as in our case, all this is conditional on the existence of
a unique long-run cointegrating relationship. Panel tests of this hypothesis were not
available in 1995, but since then a range of residual based tests have emerged.6 Resid-
ual based tests in single countries are well known to have non-standard distributions
and low power. The advantage of panel tests is that the distributions tend to asymp-
totic normal as the cross-section dimension rises, and power tends to increase. But
there is a further, often neglected, issue to consider. An aspect of the analysis of
non-stationary data is to establish the number of cointegrating relationships, r.I ft h i s
exceeds one, it becomes essential to tackle this in estimation. Larsson, Lyhagen and
L¨ othgren (2001) have developed a simple panel test for the number of cointegrating
vectors. We apply this test in the current paper, as well as single equation residual
based tests.7
We estimate a model of pricing behaviour for the manufacturing sector in 15 OECD
countries.8 After conducting single country and panel tests for order of integration (Im,
Pesaran and Shin (1997)) we then test for the existence and number of cointegrating
vectors using the panel approaches of Pedroni (2000) and the panel version of the
Johansen test. We then estimate the long-run parameters using a pooled mean group
(PMG) estimator. We test for and ﬁnd equality of the long-run coeﬃcients using
a Hausman test. We reject both PPP and Cobb Douglas technology, and ﬁnd the
markup is positively related to demand, import prices and uncertainty.
In the next section we set out the simple theory underlying the estimates. Section 3
spells out the econometric methodology. After summarising the data in Section 4, we
test for cointegration before moving on to the dynamic panel estimation in Section 6.
Section 7 concludes.
6Very little of this rapidly expanding literature has yet been published; Pedroni (1999) is an
exception, and other papers in the Oxford Bulletin special edition. McCoskey and Kao (2001)
provide some Monte Carlo comparisions of the diﬀerent tests available.
7However, see Banerjee, Marcellino and Osbat (2000) for a cautionary view of these and other
similar tests, all of which assume there are no cross country relations between the variables and that
the cointegrating rank r is common. If these conditions are true, they show the panel Johansen test
we apply has good properties. However, if they are false, results can be misleading. But the examples
they give are ones where cross unit relations are extremely likely, focussing on interest rates. In our
case there may be less of a problem.
8Countries and variables are listed and described in the Appendix.
32T h e o r y
In our work we look at the manufactured sector, so we can ignore the non-traded
sector.9 It is standard10 to assume ﬁrms are monopolistically competitive. They face




where P/P∗ is the price relative to competitors’ and Z is an index of demand. Pro-
duction is determined by a CRS production function
Q
s = F(NA,K)( 2 )
where N is employment, A labour augmenting technical progress and K is capital.11





where W/AF1 is marginal cost and 1 − 1/²(Z,P/P∗) determines the markup.12
To make (3) an estimable function we need to specify a functional form. Part of
this will follow from a particular production function, and part from more informal
considerations. It is commonly assumed the elasticity depends negatively on capacity
utilisation as an index of demand. This is not totally uncontroversial. There are argu-
ments suggesting the markup is countercyclical. Bils (1989) or more recently Ireland
(1998) argue that ﬁrms use booms to attract new customers; Rotemberg and Saloner
(1986) and (eg) Rotemberg and Woodford (1995) argue that collusive behaviour is
less likely in booms, although their argument is restricted to exceptional price wars.
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) have a model in which capital market imperfections
lead to countercyclical pricing. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) provide evidence
of countercyclical markups for the US. Note that a positive coeﬃcient on capacity
utilisation may also indicate rising marginal cost.13 The markup may also be posi-
tively related to competitors’ prices. This follows if demand becomes more inelastic
as competitors prices rise: the theoretical rationale for this is discussed in Bulow et
al (1985). Under perfect competition PPP holds and the markup equation collapses
either to p = MC or p = p∗. Finally, the markup may be related to the level of
demand uncertainty as in Price (1991). Recall that the markup is interpretable as a
supply equation. In general, factor demand and supply will depend on uncertainty.
9See Martin (1997) for a comprehensive discussion of price determination in a small open economy,
the UK.
10For example, Smith (2000).
11We can easily extend this to other inputs.
12There are ways of introducing other factor prices into the markup equation, essentially by solving
for the cost function. Then we need to allow for time varying shares of all factors.
13Bils’ (1987) paper relies largely on estimated countercyclicality in marginal costs, following in-
ﬂexible employment levels, to provide evidence for countercyclical markups. The overall evidence,
discussed in Layard, Nickell and Jackman (pp 339-340, 1991), is mixed.
4There has long been an argument that uncertainty increases factor demands, thus
reducing the markup: see Hartman (1976) for one of the earliest papers. This follows
from the possibility that the expected marginal return on factors may be increasing in
uncertainty for many production structures. More recently, the theory of investment
has tended to suggest the opposite may be true, and uncertainty will reduce invest-
ment. Uncertainty increases the ‘returns to waiting’ before doing an investment.14
But even there, ambiguity remains. However, the evidence, which is mainly related to
investment, suggests more uncertainty will reduce factor demand.15 Thus we expect
uncertainty to reduce supply, implying higher proﬁt margins. We measure uncertainty
by the conditional variance of output estimated from GARCH processes.
Some form of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology is often
assumed. In that case, using lower case letters to indicate logs, one version of (3) is
p = α0 + w − (1/σ)(q − n) − (σ − 1)/σ at + α1(p − p
∗)+α2ρ + α3var (4)
where σ is the elasticity of substitution, P∗ is the competitors’ price, ρ is an index of
demand and var is the level of uncertainty. Notice that the coeﬃcient on ‘technical
progress’ at may be positive or negative, depending on whether σ is less than or greater
than one. Note also that we can test the CES speciﬁcation as there are within-equation
restrictions. This raises the question of how wedded we are to the structure. We take
the view that statistical rejection of the CES structure is interesting information,
but should not invalidate the results. However, it does make interpretation of some
parameters less straightforward. In particular, under CES the coeﬃcients on wages
and productivity can be interpreted purely in terms of σ. The corollary is that if we
reject CES we cannot make statements about the elasticity of substitution. But this
does not mean that any results are uninformative. The unrestricted version of this
equation is
p = β0 + β1w + β2(q − n)+β3t + β4(p − p
∗)+β5ρ + β6var (5)
where at is modelled in practice as a time trend, so that β3 = −(1−β2)θ where θ is a
positive unknown and unidentiﬁed scale factor. Thus the CES speciﬁcation is testable
by the hypothesis that β3 > (<)0 if β2 < (>)−1. Given the level of aggregation, P ∗ is
the price of imports. We will measure ρ by an index of capacity utilisation; speciﬁcally,
deviations from a Hodrick Prescott ﬁltered trend of manufacturing output. A test of
short-run PPP - which amounts to assuming perfect competition - is β4 = β5 =
0. However, it should be clear that PPP is generally considered to be a long-run
phenomenon. Moreover, as labour costs and productivity are endogenous the system
within which (4) is embedded may exhibit PPP even if the individual equation does not
appear to exhibit it. Static homogeneity, which follows from the ﬁrst order condition, is
an essential property of the price relationship.16 It is sometimes argued that dynamic
homogeneity is important too, so that the price level is unaﬀected by the rate of
14This is known as the ‘real-options’ approach to irreversible investment under uncertainty. See
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for an exemplary treatment.
15Driver and Moreton (1992) and Price (1996); see also Price (1994) for evidence on employment.
16With commonly assumed Cobb-Douglas technology σ is unity so w−(1/σ)(q−n) may be replaced
by unit labour costs. In that case p = β0 + β1(w − q + n)+β4(p − p∗)+β5ρ + β6var where static
5inﬂation. But this is not obvious. While static homogeneity follows from fundamental
properties of cost and demand functions, this is not the case for dynamic homogeneity,
which amounts to assuming super-neutrality in a monetary model. Indeed, there
are models (and some evidence) that suggest inﬂation does aﬀect the markup: see
Banerjee, Cockerell and Russell (2001). In any case, our main focus in this paper is on
the pooled long-run estimates. Given these arguments together with the small sample
used to estimate the dynamics, we did not attempt to impose or test the implied
dynamic restrictions.
We interpret these as long-run relationships. In estimation, we use an ECM speciﬁca-
tion to capture short-run behaviour consistent with this long-run. Thus, as is usually
the case in related empirical work, we do not formally derive the dynamics. However,
it is possible to do so; for example, in Price (1992) ﬁrms set prices according to ex-
pected future costs and demand. A particular intertemporal quadratic loss function
then implies restrictions on the coeﬃcients on future forcing variables.
3 Econometric methodology
3.1 Dynamic heterogeneous panels
The data set we are examining covers 15 countries (N = 15) over 27 years.17 The data
also has complex dynamics and is characterised by strong trends and non-stationarity.
Such data sets18 raise special problems in estimation. Pesaran and Smith (1995)
show that, unlike in static models, pooled dynamic heterogeneous models generate
estimates that are inconsistent even in large samples. In the type of data set we are
considering T is suﬃciently large to allow individual country estimation. Nevertheless,
we may still be able to exploit the cross-section dimension of the data to some extent.
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) (PSS) observe that while it is implausible that the
dynamic speciﬁcation is the same in all countries, it is at least conceivable that the
long-run parameters of the model may be common. They propose estimation by either
averaging the individual country estimates, or by pooling the long-run parameters, if
the data allows, and estimating the model as a system.19 T h e yr e f e rt ot h i sa st h e
homogeneity implies β1 = 1. The Cobb Douglas case is strongly rejected in the results below. This is
not surprising, given the wealth of macroeconometric evidence rejecting unit elasticity of substitution.
What is more surprising, is that most empirical price markup equations use unit labour costs as the
cost variable.
17Although we have more data for manufacturing output, needed to calculate a ﬁltered trend.
18Termed ‘data ﬁelds’ by Danny Quah, eg, Quah (1993).
19Baltagi and Griﬃn (1997) argue that the eﬃciency gains of pooling the data outweigh the losses
from the bias induced by heterogeneity. They support this argument in two ways. Firstly, they
informally assess the plausibility of the estimates they obtain for a model of gasoline demand using
diﬀerent methods. This is hard to evaluate as it relies upon a judgement about what is ‘plausible’.
Monte Carlo simulations would make the comparision clearer. Secondly, they compare forecast
performance. However, this is a weak test to apply to the averaging technique, which is designed
only to estimate long-run parameters and not the short-run dynamics. Baltagi and Griﬃnd on o t
consider the next method to be discussed, the PMG.
6pooled mean group estimator, or PMG. It combines the eﬃciency of pooled estimation
while avoiding the inconsistency problem ﬂowing from pooling heterogeneous dynamic
relationships. It is this latter method we apply.
The unrestricted speciﬁcation for the system of ARDL equations for t =1 ,2,...,T









ijxi,t−j + µi + εit (6)
where xi,t−j is the (k × 1) vector of explanatory variables for group i and µi are the
ﬁxed eﬀects. In principle the panel can be unbalanced and p and q may vary across
countries. (6) can be reparametrised as a VECM system.










ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit (7)
where the βi are the long-run parameters and θi are the equilibrium (or error) cor-
rection parameters. The pooled mean group restriction is that the elements of β are
common across countries.









ij∆xi,t−j + µi + εit (8)
Estimation could proceed by iterated least squares, imposing and testing the cross-
country restrictions on β. However, this will be ineﬃcient as it ignores the contempo-
raneous residual covariances. A natural estimator is Zellner’s SUR method,20 which
is a form of feasible GLS. SUR estimation is only possible if N is smaller than T.
Thus PSS suggest a maximum likelihood estimator. In our case SUR is feasible, but
we use the eﬃcient PSS method.21 They argue that in panels omitted group speciﬁc
factors or measurement errors are likely to severely bias the country estimates. It is
a commonplace in empirical panel studies to report a failure of the ‘poolability’ tests
based on the group parameter restrictions.22 So PSS propose a Hausman test. This
is based on the result that an estimate of the mean long-run parameters in the model
can be derived from the average (mean group) of the country regressions. This is con-
sistent even under heterogeneity. However, if the parameters are in fact homogeneous,
the mean and the individual parameters coincide and the PMG estimates are more
eﬃcient. Thus we can form the test statistic
H =ˆ q
0[var(ˆ q)]
−1ˆ q ∼ χ
2
k
where ˆ q is a (k × 1) vector of the diﬀerence between the mean group and PMG
estimates and var(ˆ q) is the corresponding covariance matrix. Under the null that
20Zellner (1962).
21Implemented in a GAUSS program made available at Hashem Pesaran’s website: we are grateful
to PSS for making this available.
22For example, Baltagi and Griﬃn (1997, p 308) state that although the poolability test is massively
failed (F(102,396) = 10.99; critical value about 1.3), ‘like most researchers we proceed to estimate
pooled models.’
7the two estimators are consistent but one is eﬃcient, var(ˆ q) is easily calculated as the
diﬀerence between the covariance matrices for the two underlying parameter vectors. If
the poolability assumption is invalid then the PMG estimates are no longer consistent
and the test rejects.
3.2 Panel cointegration
The other issue here is the existence of a long-run equilibrium. With non-stationary
d a t a ,a si no u rc a s e ,e s t i m a t i o ni sc o n d i t i onal on the existence of a unique long-run
cointegrating relationship. In Pesaran, Shin and Smith this is assumed, rather than
tested.
3.2.1 Residual based tests
There is now a range of panel residual based tests available.23 Residual based tests
in single countries are well known to have non-standard distributions and low power.
In panels the distributions tend to asymptotic normal as the cross-section dimension
rises, and power usually increases.24 The Pedroni tests which we use25 allow for
heterogeneity among the panel members. All are based on the residuals from the
( m o s tg e n e r a l )r e g r e s s i o n s
yit = αi + δit + βixit + eit. (9)
Pedroni constructs seven tests, four of which are based on pooling along the ‘within-
dimension’ and three the ‘between-dimension’. The former eﬀectively pool the autore-
gressive coeﬃcient in the residual based test and the latter take the average, allowing
more heterogeneity. Pedroni refers to the within statistics as panel cointegration statis-
tics, and to the between statistics as group mean panel cointegration statistics, a nat-
ural terminology given our discussion above. The panel tests are the panel v-statistic
(a variance bounds test), the panel ρ-statistic (analagous to the Phillips Perron ρ
test), and nonparametric and parametric panel t-statistics (or more accurately, ADF
statistics). The group tests are the group ρ-statistic and the two group t-statistics.
3.2.2 Multiple cointegrating vectors
Another important issue not addressed by the residual based tests, however, is the
number of cointegrating relationships, r. If this exceeds one, it becomes essential
23See for example Pedroni (1999), McCoskey and Kao (2001).
24Nevertheless, the tests are powerful against an arguably uninteresting alternative. They examine
the null that there are unit roots in all of the N groups. Rejection does not, therefore, imply that all
the series are I(0), simply that they are not all I(1). We are grateful to Ron Smith for making this
point clear to us. Karlsson and L¨ othgren (2000) make the same point in their paper which examines
the power of various panel unit root tests against various alternatives.
25We are grateful to Peter Pedroni for making his RATS procedures available to us.
8to tackle this in estimation. In single time series, this is normally tested with the
Johansen procedure. It is only recently that a panel test for the existence of multiple
cointegrating vectors has been developed (Larsson, Lyhagen and L¨ othgren (2001)).
Larrsson et al examine the mean of the standard Johansen LR (trace) tests from
a heterogeneous panel.26 They show analytically that the ﬁrst two moments of the
statistic exist and perform Monte Carlo experiments to derive small sample properties.







where E(Zk)a n dvar(Zk) are the mean and variance of the asymptotic trace statistic,







is the simple average of the standard Johansen trace statistic for the hypothesis of
reduced rank from (full rank) p to r.27 The hypothesis tested is
H0 : rank(Πi)=ri ≤ p for all i =1 ,...,N
against the alternative
H1 : rank(Πi)=p for all i =1 ,...,N.
This pair of hypotheses is the panel analogue of the single time series trace statis-
tic. E(Zk)a n dvar(Zk) may be calculated by simulation (Johansen (1995)). The
properties of the statistic are asymptotic. In our sample, we have a relatively short T.
Reimers (1992) has suggested a small sample adjustment to the test statistics (namely,
(T − pk)/T)w h e r ep is the number of variables in the model and k is the lag length
used). There is no theoretical justiﬁcation for the adjustment, but as Johansen (1995)
observes, the approximation to the limit distribution appears to be better with the
correction. Thus we use this adjustment in the empirical work.
4D a t a
A data set of this size is hard to summarise. The data in the speciﬁcation of the long-
run relationship are the logs of manufacturing producer prices (p = ln(P)), labour
26The model is restrictive because it assumes there are no covariances between equations errors,
and that there are no inﬂuences across countries. In particular, the α matric of loadings is assumed
to be diagonal. These assumptions are relaxed in Larsson and Lyhagen (1999). However, in our case
the dimensions of the problem make estimation of either the non-diagonal α or covariance matrices
impossible.
27Results are derived for the case of an unrestricted constant and no deterministic trends in or
out of the cointegrating space. Gerdtham and L¨ othgren (2000) conjecture the results also hold for
the case where there is a linear trend in the cointegrating space, the one applicable to our case.
The moments are calculated by simulation, and we are grateful to Mickael L¨ othgren for making his
GAUSS procedure available to us.
9costs (w), productivity (q − n where q = ln(Q), n = ln(N), Q is output and N
employment) and the ratio of domestic to foreign prices (p − p∗ where p∗ = lnP∗
and P∗ is manufacturing import prices). All variables are described in the Appendix.
Inspection of the data suggest that the series are non-stationary. Individual ADF
tests reported in Table 1 generally suggest the series are I(1) for prices and wages.
However, the evidence for productivity and relative prices is less clear cut. As with
tests for cointegration, use of a panel increases the power of tests for cointegration
and we therefore apply the Im, Pesaran and Shin (1997) test for cointegration. These
results are also given in Table 2, and provide strong evidence that the series are I(1).
There are also two constructed series which enter as I(0) variables. Firstly, we used
deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott trend28 as our demand indicator. The Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter is well known to suﬀer from statistical deﬁciencies, of which possibly
the worst is the ‘end sample’ problem, whereby the ﬁltered trend tends to ﬁxo nt h e
actual values. Thus we used a longer data series to generate the HP trend than in
estimation of the model. Secondly, we model the conditional variance of output growth
with individual GARCH(1,1) processes estimated for each country where the mean is
estimated as a random walk.29
5 Tests for cointegration
Given the results reported above, we maintain the hypothesis that all the explanatory
series are I(1) with the exception of demand and uncertainty.
5.1 Pedroni tests
We estimated (5), repeated here for the reader’s convenience:
p = β0 + β1w + β2(q − n)+β3t + β4(p − p
∗)+β5ρ + β6var.
As ρ and var are I(0) by construction they are not included in the tests. The results
are given in Table 2.
The (one sided) test statistics are distributed asymptotic standard normal. The critical
v a l u ef o rt h ep a n e lv-statistic is positive, while the others are negative. The properties
of the tests have not been investigated in detail for the multivariate case, but we have
a prior belief that heterogeneity in the autoregressive process is likely, so we prefer to
be guided by the group statistics.30 We report results for the unrestricted case and
also when we impose homogeneity; we concentrate on the latter results. In the panel
28Using λ = 7 as we have annual data. This value is the annual equivalent to the 1600 recommended
by Hodrick and Prescott for quarterly data. The rationale is that it allows cycles with longer than
business cycle frequencies to pass through.
29An AR(1) process produces similar results.
30In the next section we report that the estimated ecm coeﬃcients diﬀer widely, so this was an
appropriate assumption.
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Unit root tests on ∆y
Price Labour costs Productivity Relative price
p w q − n p − p∗
Individual ADF tests ( lag=1)
Austria -3.047 -3.134 -2.351 -2.888
Belgium -2.33 -3.85 -2.631 -2.053
Canada -3.182 -3.196 -2.745 -2.552
Denmark -2.757 -2.749 -2.001 -0.187
France -2.777 -2.802 -2.19 -2.303
Germany -2.582 -3.119 -1.709 -1.29
Ireland -4.024 -3.541 -2.856 -2.285
Italy -3.301 -3.323 -1.299 -2.735
Japan -3.611 -3.689 -2.151 -1.374
Netherlands -2.771 -2.905 -1.27 -1.731
Sweden -2.819 -1.936 -2.057 -2.078
Spain -2.803 -3.832 -2.174 -3.327
Switzerland -2.614 -1.097 -0.249 -0.547
UK -2.77 -3.737 -0.349 -1.927
US -3.055 -2.699 -3.247 -2.893
Panel tests
t-bar -2.963 -3.041 -1.952 -2.011
Panel test -7.663 -7.954 -2.263 -2.574
Individual ADF tests ( lag=2)
Austria -4.354 -3.762 -3.097 -2.656
Belgium -2.444 -3.753 -4.489 -2.213
Canada -4.154 -3.5 -2.433 -2.246
Denmark -3.288 -5.968 -2.3 -0.305
France -3.412 -5.129 -3.199 -1.798
Germany -3.832 -2.275 -1.558 -2.072
Ireland -4.164 -4.311 -2.205 -1.994
Italy -4.738 -5.053 -1.353 -2.922
Japan -5.357 -5.475 -1.678 -0.897
Netherlands -3.333 -3.417 -1.346 -1.143
Sweden -3.566 -3.622 -2.289 -2.329
Spain -3.103 -2.211 -1.298 -2.634
Switzerland -3.1 -0.741 -0.259 -0.209
UK -4.462 -3.625 -0.349 -1.74
US -4.617 -2.679 -3.451 -2.67
Panel tests
t-bar -3.862 -3.701 -2.087 -1.855
Panel test -12.455 -11.630 -3.316 -2.123
Individual tests: 5% critical values for 1 and 2 lags are -2.895 and -2.990 respectively.
Panel tests: 5% critical values is -1.65.
11Table 2
Pedroni panel cointegration tests
Non-homogeneous Homogeneous
panel v -0.51379 0.55013
panel ρ 1.59449 0.67276
panel PP t -0.47479 -1.48322
panel t -2.28033 -3.05892
group ρ 2.12882 1.32954
group PP t -1.07620 -1.83090
group t -6.82999 -8.16296
N= 15 , T= 27
statistics, only the ADF statistic supports cointegration. In the group statistics, there
is weak evidence from the Phillips Perron test and strong evidence from the ADF
test. Thus we consider these results to give limited support for the hypothesis that
cointegration exists given the CES speciﬁcation imposing homogeneity.
5.2 Panel Johansen tests
The alternative test we use is the panel version of the Johansen test described above,
which also enables us to to test for the number of cointegrating vectors. Table 3 gives
Johansen trace test statistics for each country in our sample, maintaining the CES
function and homogeneity (which reduces the maximum rank by one). We report
both the uncorrected and Reimers-corrected test statistics for all the possible ranks.
The uncorrected test statistics reject r = 0 for all but ﬁve countries (or all but two
at 10%); the panel statistic strongly rejects r = 0. Moreover, for six countries we
reject r = 1 at 5%, and the panel test statistic conﬁrms this. When we use the
small sample correction the individual statistics now reject r = 0 for six countries,
but reject r = 1 for only three. The panel statistics now clearly indicate that we can
reject the hypothesis of no cointegration and cannot reject the hypothesis that there
is a single cointegrating vector. We interpret this as strong evidence for the existence
of unique cointegrating vectors among this group. Given that the data is certainly
non stationary, the fact that we are conﬁdent no more than one cointegrating vector
exists allows us to apply the dynamic panel methodology reported below. Remember
that we have not imposed a homogeneous cointegrating vector among the countries.
We test for this in the next section when we estimate the vectors.
12Table 3
Johansen Likelihood Ratio (Trace) statistics
Likelihood Ratio Reimers adjusted:
Test Statistics (T-pk)/T
r =0 r =1 r =2 r =0 r =1 r =2
Austria 40.41 12.27 3.36 35.56 10.80 2.96
Belgium 69.74 32.36 8.27 61.37 28.48 7.27
Canada 95.29 29.92 2.79 83.85 26.33 2.46
Denmark 41.05 16.63 4.47 36.12 14.63 3.93
France 77.29 34.81 7.76 68.01 30.63 6.82
Germany 36.25 11.69 2.76 31.90 10.29 2.43
Ireland 37.33 10.26 2.76 32.85 9.03 2.43
Italy 41.91 17.48 4.66 36.88 15.39 4.10
Japan 43.07 26.28 10.79 37.91 23.13 9.50
Netherlands 47.78 13.53 3.05 42.05 11.91 2.68
Sweden 40.55 11.84 1.56 35.68 10.42 1.37
Spain 58.87 28.17 6.24 51.81 24.79 5.49
Switzerland 46.81 10.03 1.25 41.19 8.83 1.10
UK 50.61 23.53 5.25 44.54 20.71 4.62
US 51.74 19.76 3.18 45.53 17.38 2.79
5% crit. value 42.44 25.32 12.25 42.44 25.32 12.25
panel stat. 12.18 2.62 -2.07 8.66 0.81 -2.72
I(1) variables included are p, p − p∗, w and q − n with homogeneity imposed. VAR
based on one lag including ρ and var as I(0) regressors.
5% critical values are standard Johansen values with deterministic trend in the
cointegrating space.
Panel statistic distributed asymptotic standard normal.
136 Estimation of a heterogeneous dynamic panel
In this section we report the results of estimating the parameter of our markup equa-
tion (5).
Table 4 reports the unrestricted estimates. Recall they are based on ecm speciﬁcations.
T h el a gs t r u c t u r ei sd e t e r m i n e de m p i r i c a lly by the SBC, and is allowed to vary between
countries. The completely unrestricted (unpooled) individual country results are of
no particular interest and are not reported. It is worth noting, however, that as
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) observe, in common with most similar studies, we ‘ﬁnd
diﬀerences in coeﬃcients which are not only statistically signiﬁcant, but economically
implausible.’ They go on to observe that the pooled long-run coeﬃcients are more
sensible, and this turns out to be the case here. They argue that omitted group speciﬁc
factors or measurement errors severely bias the country estimates.
It is legitimate to ignore the unrestricted estimates because the Hausman tests do
not reject poolability of the long-run parameters, either individually or jointly. This
means that the eﬃcient estimates of the common long-run parameters are given by
the PMG method (although we also report the mean group results). These are the key
results. All the coeﬃcients are very well determined. The coeﬃcient on labour costs
has a particularly low standard error and, while numerically greater, is insigniﬁcantly
diﬀerent from one. Thus we accept homogeneity. The productivity coeﬃcient is cor-
rectly signed but implies an elasticity of substitution larger than is normally assumed;
it is around 2. This implies the trend term should be negative, but it is signiﬁcantly
positive, which rejects the CES structure. As argued above, this makes it more diﬃ-
cult to interpret particular coeﬃcients but should not lead to rejection of other results.
The coeﬃcient on relative prices is in line with our prior beliefs (higher foreign prices
allow margins to increase). A rise in demand raises margins.31 A rise in uncertainty
lowers margins, as we expected. All the error correction coeﬃcients (not reported)
lie between -0.1 and -1. Of the 15, three are insigniﬁcant. However, the group mean
estimate is -0.546 and is highly signiﬁcant. This is more evidence for cointegration.32
We report the ineﬃcient mean group estimates. They diﬀer markedly from the PMG
estimates but are also much worse determined, reﬂecting the ineﬃciency of the mean
group method for this dataset. We cannot reject the individual hypotheses that the
mean group estimates take their PMG values.
As homogeneity cannot be rejected we reestimated the equations imposing this restric-
tion. Table 5 gives the results. Pooling cannot be rejected for individual coeﬃcients,
but is only just accepted jointly. The coeﬃcient on the variance term becomes much
smaller and insigniﬁcant. The other parameters are much the same, although the co-
eﬃcient on demand rises. The mean group estimates now diﬀer drastically (especially
for the variance), although nothing is signiﬁcant. As the variance results appear some-
what unrobust, we drop the term. If we impose homogeneity poolability is accepted
31These last two results could be interpreted to mean that we have made a small contribution to
the PPP debate; PPP is rejected.





Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates
Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val
w 1.028 0.016 63.195 0.904 0.271 3.339 0.21 0.65
q − n -0.536 0.060 -8.928 0.244 1.263 0.193 0.38 0.54
p − p∗ -0.400 0.047 -8.521 0.827 0.785 1.053 2.45 0.12
ρ 0.725 0.096 7.554 0.513 0.471 1.089 0.21 0.65
var 6.696 2.038 3.286 76.254 39.074 1.952 0.18 0.67
Joint Hausman test 4.55 0.47
θ -0.546 0.089 -6.171 -0.828 0.161 -5.127
constant -0.007 0.001 -5.061 -0.019 0.016 -1.213
trend 0.107 0.029 3.705 0.328 0.440 0.747
θ mean group ecm coeﬃcient.
and the well determined parameters are extremely close to those reported in Table
4. Thus although there is clearly a question surrounding the role of uncertainty, the
results regarding productivity, homogeneity, competitors’ prices and demand appear
robust. These conclusions could not have been reached by examining the individual
country estimates alone. Fianlly, Table 7 gives the results for the key parameters of a
simple ﬁxed eﬀects regression. The parameters are plausible, but numerically diﬀerent
from the PMG results.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
The availability of country panels where the data can be described as ‘data ﬁelds’ with
roughly equivalent N and T make it possible to exploit information from the cross-
section about time series relationships. However, where dynamic models are called
for, which will be the rule with typical non-stationary macroeconomic time series,
standard pooled models are not simply ineﬃcient but may also be highly inconsistent.
This is also true for dynamic models with stationary regressors. Nevertheless, there
may be a case for estimating long-run parameters in a pooled framework, as suggested
by Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). This restricted
poolability can be tested for by a Hausman type test. We examine a sample of 15
OECD countries for which we have consistent data. In our data set, individual and
panel tests for order of integration reveal that the core variables are non-stationary.
Thus for estimation to be valid, the data must also satisfy tests for the unique ex-
istence of long-run relationships (which may nevertheless be heterogeneous between
countries). We test for cointegration using Pedroni’s residual based panel unit root
tests, and a panel version of the Johansen trace statistic. There is indeed evidence for
15Table 5
Restricted markup equation: homogeneity.
Dependent variable pit;c o e ﬃcient on wit restricted to unity.
Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates
Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val
q − n -0.505 0.082 -6.132 -6.536 6.195 -1.055 0.95 0.33
p − p∗ -0.374 0.064 -5.858 -15.827 16.408 -0.965 0.89 0.35
ρ 0.917 0.137 6.689 -26.753 26.566 -1.007 1.08 0.30
var 0.044 4.628 0.010 -750.275 614.408 -1.221 1.49 0.22
Joint Hausman test 8.87 0.06
θ -0.396 0.080 -4.951 -0.519 0.105 -4.939
constant -0.003 0.001 -4.348 -0.009 0.004 -2.460
trend 0.080 0.022 3.629 0.222 0.071 3.124
Table 6
Restricted markup equation: homogeneity; excluding VAR.
Dependent variable pit;c o e ﬃcient on wit restricted to unity.
Pooled MGE Estimates MGE Estimates
Coef. St. Er. t-ratio Coef. St. Er. t-ratio h-test p-val
q − n -0.597 0.063 -9.519 -0.181 0.806 -0.224 0.27 0.60
p − p∗ -0.387 0.046 -8.432 -0.327 0.562 -0.581 0.01 0.91
ρ 0.735 0.108 6.805 -0.088 0.644 -0.137 1.68 0.20
Joint Hausman test 3.16 0.37
θ -0.443 0.089 -4.988 -0.517 0.114 -4.555
constant -0.002 0.001 -3.623 -0.004 0.003 -1.310
trend 0.068 0.023 3.003 0.112 0.067 1.658
Table 7
Static ﬁxed eﬀects estimates of the unrestricted markup equation.
Dependent variable pit.
FE Robust
Coef. St. Er. t-ratio St. Er. t-ratio
w 0.9781 0.0184 53.2406 0.0546 17.9235
q − n -0.4848 0.0444 -10.9122 0.1259 -3.8506
p − p∗ -0.1962 0.0469 -4.1810 0.1295 -1.5146
ρ 0.5489 0.1417 3.8744 0.1402 3.9153
var 11.3933 3.2343 3.5227 3.1331 3.6364
16the existence of unique cointegrating relationships in the panel members. Moreover,
the Hausman test cannot reject pooling of the long-run parameters. The pooled esti-
mates accord with our expectations and are well determined. It appears that for these
countries long-run price formation can be modelled as a variable markup over costs
driven by productivity, labour costs and technical progress. The markup also depends
on competitors’ prices, deviations from trend output and uncertainty. These con-
clusions could not have been reached by examining the individual country estimates
alone. Nor could they have been reached by conventional panel estimation. Reliance
on a static panel would be misleading. There are many applications to cross-country
data where the same methodology can fruitfully be applied.
17Appendix: Data sources
The countries in the sample were Austria (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CN), Denmark
(DK), France (FR), Germany (GE), Ireland (IR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), Netherlands
(NL), Sweden (SD), Spain (SP), Switzerland (SW), the United Kingdom (UK) and
the United States (US). All data were annual over the period 1970 to 1996, with the
exception of manufacturing output, which was 1966 to 1997. The longer period was
essential to avoid the ‘end-point’ bias in the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter.
Unit labour costs (ULC = WN/Q) (1990=100) - series for all countries apart from
Australia, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland from BLS. For the US, data from 1977-
96 from BLS. Data for 1970-76 constructed using manufacturing output from OECD
National Accounts and labour compensation from the National Income and Product
Accounts. For Australia, data for 1981-95 from OECDHS. Data for 1970-80 and 1996
constructed using information on earnings, output and employment in manufacturing
from OECDHS and MEI. For Ireland, data constructed using structed using data on
manufacturing employment and earnings and industrial production from OECDHS.
For Spain, data from 1981-95 from OECDHS. Data for 1970-80 interpolated in line
with whole economy unit labour costs constructed from compensation and GDP in
OECD National Accounts. For Switzerland, data from OECDHS, various issues.
Manufacturing Import Prices (P ∗) (1990=100) - from EO unless otherwise stated. For
the UK, prices constructed using the value and volume of imported manufactures from
the National Accounts. For Switzerland, data from IFS country page (line no. 76).
For Ireland, data for aggregate merchandise imports. German data for 1996 estimated
using growth rate of merchandise import prices in OECD Economic Outlook, June
1998.
Producer Prices (P) (1990=100) - data for US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, UK,
Italy and Spain from NiGEM. Data for Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and
Switzerland from IFS. Data for Australia from OECDHS. For Belgium, data for 1980-
96 from IFS, data for 1970-79 from OECDHS. Deﬁn i t i o n so fs e r i e sm a yd i ﬀer across
countries, with some having wholesale price data.
Manufacturing Employment (N) (1990=100) - data from BLS unless otherwise stated.
For Australia, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland data from OECDHS. Adjustments made
to Australian series in 1989 and Switzerland series in 1985 to allow for breaks in
deﬁnition.
Manufacturing Output (Q) (constant prices, 1990=100) - data from BLS unless other-
wise stated. For US, data for 1966-76 from OECD National Accounts. For Australia,
data from OECDHS. For Ireland, Spain and Switzerland we use industrial production
from IFS.
BLS - International Comparisons of Manufacturing Productivity and Unit Labour Cost
Trends, Bureau of Labor Statistics. EO - OECD Economic Outlook, historical data
diskettes. IFS - International Financial Statistics Yearbook, International Monetary
Fund. MEI - Main Economic Indicators, OECD. NiGEM - National Institute Global
18Econometric Model database. Further details available on request. OECDHS - OECD
Historical Statistics 1960-95.
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